{"id":695,"date":"2023-12-28T12:00:27","date_gmt":"2023-12-28T18:00:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/law-journal\/?p=695"},"modified":"2024-01-02T16:09:50","modified_gmt":"2024-01-02T22:09:50","slug":"commentary-on-quinn-v-lmc","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/law-journal\/2023\/12\/28\/commentary-on-quinn-v-lmc\/","title":{"rendered":"Commentary on Quinn v. LMC"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

A Case Holding it as Illegal to Lockout a Long-Term Roommate of the Leaseholder Without a Court Order[1]<\/a><\/h2>\n

Paul Birnberg is a veteran housing attorney with 25 years of experience handling landlord-tenant matters in the Minnesota Area. More articles from Mr. Birnberg can be found on his website,\u00a0The \u00a0Birnberg Minnesota Legislative Newsletter<\/a>. \u00a0The views expressed in this article are entirely his own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Mitchell Hamline Journal of Public Policy and Practice.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

\"\"<\/a>

Article by Paul Birnberg<\/strong><\/p><\/div>\n

I.\u00a0 Introduction<\/h2>\n

On April 4, 2022, the Minnesota Court of Appeals issued Quinn v. LMC NE Minneapolis Holdings, LLC<\/em>, 972 N.W.2d 881 (Minn. Ct. App. 2022), rev. granted (June 29, 2022), rev. dismissed (Feb. 17, 2023). This precedential opinion construed the phrase \u201cother regular occupants\u201d in Minn. Stat. \u00a7 504B.001 as it applies to a lockout petition brought under Minn. Stat. \u00a7 504B.375. The court\u2019s relatively broad construction of \u201cother regular occupant\u201d protects the roommate of a tenant against lockout even after the tenant has vacated the apartment and left the (ex-) roommate to occupy the apartment alone. The court held that a no-other-occupants clause in the tenant\u2019s lease was just one factor in deciding if the roommate was an \u201cother regular occupant.\u201d<\/p>\n

The court\u2019s analysis was based on dictionary definitions of \u201cregular\u201d and on a 1946 hotel-guest-versus-boarder case. In my analysis of the same issue, I review the history of the 1970s session laws underlying \u00a7 504B.375 because this section derives from Minn. Stat. \u00a7 566.175, which was first enacted in 1975.<\/p>\n

\u00a0 II.\u00a0 Facts<\/h2>\n

Kera Quinn lived continuously with Jamie Smith in a fancy Minneapolis apartment owned by LMC.[2]<\/a> It was Quinn\u2019s sole residence for more than two years. She used the building\u2019s facilities, e.g., the meeting room, received mail and visitors there, used the apartment’s key fob (which she and Smith shared), walked by the concierge daily, and otherwise interacted with the building\u2019s staff. There was no proof that Quinn was a subtenant of Smith.[3]<\/a><\/p>\n

Quinn was not on the lease with LMC; only Smith was. Smith\u2019s lease ran from October 8, 2020 to April 7, 2021. Smith gave proper notice to terminate the lease effective April 7. Smith moved out by April 7 although she apparently left behind some personal items.[4]<\/a><\/p>\n

Smith\u2019s lease included these provisions:<\/p>\n

[Clause 2] No one else may occupy the apartment. Persons not listed [on the lease] must not stay in the apartment for more than 14 consecutive days without [LMC’s] prior written consent, and no more than twice that many days in any one month\u2026.<\/p>\n

[Clause 31] Replacing a resident, subletting, assignment, or granting a right or license to occupy is allowed only when [LMC] expressly consent in writing\u2026.<\/p>\n

On April 8, 2021\u2014the day after Smith left for good and the day after the end of Smith\u2019s lease\u2014LMC changed the apartment locks effectively locking out Quinn.[5]<\/a><\/p>\n

III.\u00a0 Procedural posture<\/h2>\n

Quinn filed a \u201clockout petition\u201d under Minn. Stat. \u00a7 504B.375, which allows a \u201cresidential tenant\u201d to be restored to possession when the \u201clandlord\u201d locks her out without a court order. Quinn alleged that she was a \u201cresidential tenant\u201d because she was an \u201cother regular occupant\u201d under Minn. Stat. \u00a7 504B.001, subd. 12:<\/p>\n

Subd. 12. Residential tenant<\/strong>. “Residential tenant” means a person who is occupying a dwelling in a residential building under a lease or contract, whether oral or written, that requires the payment of money or exchange of services, all other regular occupants of that dwelling unit, or a resident of a manufactured home park.<\/p>\n

The trial court found that Quinn was an \u201cother regular occupant\u201d based on the totality of the facts (as outlined above) and therefore eligible to file her lockout petition under Minn. Stat. \u00a7 504B.375. It ordered LMC to restore Quinn to possession by reactivating the key fob.<\/p>\n

LMC appealed this ruling claiming Quinn was a \u201ctrespasser\u201d and not a \u201cresidential tenant.\u201d LMC\u2019s main argument was that Quinn was not a \u201cregular\u201d occupant because Smith\u2019s lease disallowed Quinn or anybody other than Smith to occupy the apartment without LMC\u2019s permission and no such permission had been given; therefore, Quinn was \u201cirregular.\u201d<\/p>\n

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court and its use of totality of the facts to decide that Quinn was an \u201cother regular occupant.\u201d It affirmed that the no-other-occupants clause in Smith\u2019s lease was just one of a number of the totality of facts to consider.<\/p>\n

On May 4, 2022, thirty days after the Court of Appeals issued its decision, LMC filed a petition for review. On June 29, 2022 the petition was granted.[6]<\/a><\/p>\n

In the meantime, LMC had filed two eviction actions against Ms. Smith and Ms. Quinn.[7]<\/a> The first case has been expunged; the second case was filed on April 1, 2022.[8]<\/a> The cases were settled on June 3, 2022. Ms. Smith had already moved out and Ms. Quinn agreed to vacate by July 15, 2022. When Ms. Quinn did not vacate by July 15, a Writ of Recovery was issued and soon thereafter Ms. Quinn did vacate.[9]<\/a><\/p>\n

LMC filed its supreme-court brief on July 29, 2022. On August 17, Ms. Quinn filed a motion to dismiss the supreme court case arguing that, because Ms. Quinn had vacated, her lockout petition was moot.[10]<\/a> Ms, Quinn then filed her supreme court brief on August 29, and LMC filed its reply brief on September 16. On October 18 the supreme court ruled that oral argument would be scheduled and deferred ruling on the motion to dismiss. Oral argument was held on November 28, 2022.[11]<\/a><\/p>\n

On February 23, 2023, the supreme court dismissed the case as moot.[12]<\/a><\/p>\n

A. The Supreme Court dismissed LMC\u2019s appeal as moot rejecting LMC\u2019s arguments that the case was ripe.<\/h3>\n

The court reasoned that the case was presumptively moot since Quinn had been evicted by court process. It then reviewed the three mootness exceptions LMC had argued in opposing dismissal of the case: (i) functionally justiciable, (ii) capable of repetition but evading review, and (iii) collateral consequences.[13]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u00a0 i.\u00a0 The dispute between LMC and Quinn appears to be functionally justiciable.<\/h4>\n

First, a presumptively moot case is functionally justiciable if it has been adequately argued and is of statewide significance. It was adequately argued. However, \u201cnothing in the record supports the broad claim that these parties’ unique circumstances present a statewide issue affecting most landlord-tenant relationships.\u201d[14]<\/a> The crux of the court\u2019s reasoning seems to depend on the fact that Ms. Quinn was locked out during an eviction moratorium as set out in footnote 4 of the order which read:<\/p>\n

The context of this matter also occurred during an unprecedented time concerning landlord-tenant disputes: during the eviction moratorium imposed by the state because of a worldwide pandemic.\u00a0See<\/em>\u00a0Emerg. Exec. Order No. 20-14,\u00a0Suspending Evictions and Writs of Recovery During the COVID-19 Peacetime Emergency<\/em>\u00a0(Mar. 23, 2020). The moratorium has since ended, and landlords once again have the right immediately to file for evictions and writs of recovery under Chapter 504B.\u00a0See<\/em>\u00a0Act of June 29, 2021, ch. 8, art. 5, \u00a7\u00a7 2, 4, 2021 Minn. Laws 1825, 1849-50 (implementing an eviction moratorium phaseout plan so that on June 1, 2022, eviction proceedings could return to normal, pre-pandemic process).[15]<\/a><\/p>\n

When the supreme court granted review on June 29, 2022, the pandemic-based eviction moratorium had completely ended 28 days ago. Therefore, it seems odd for the court to invoke the uniqueness of the pandemic as a reason to decide the case was not of statewide significance.<\/p>\n

Putting aside this internal inconsistency, the Quinn\/Smith situation did not arise from the pandemic. Leaseholders inviting in a friend to live with them even though their lease forbids it is not that rare an occurrence. Sometimes this is because the leaseholder and invitee are lovers or spouses. Other times the leaseholder is a college student or group of students. As semesters pass, it is pretty common for one student to replace another without a change in the lease and eventually for the final occupants to be completely new occupants. Pandemic or no pandemic, landlords will face the holdover-invitee on a regular basis \u2013 not in a high percentage of tenancies but given the hundreds of thousands of tenancies in the state this situation will, in absolute numbers, not be that rare.[16]<\/a><\/p>\n

In accord with this conclusion is that both pro-Quinn amici claimed the issue was of statewide significance. HOME Line and Housing Justice Center wrote, \u201cNarrowing the definition of residential tenant to exclude those whose occupancy in their own homes is somehow deemed \u201cirregular\u201d will categorically exclude a significant number of people who deserve, and currently receive, legal protection offered under the language, structure, and purpose of Chapter 504B.\u201d[17]<\/a> Standpoint and Violence Free Minnesota wrote, \u201cResolution of the question presented in this case will have a statewide impact on people who reside at a property without a formal lease agreement and a statewide impact on their available legal protections and recourse when issues over their housing arise.\u201d[18]<\/a><\/p>\n

Therefore, while I think that the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision was correct and that the Supreme Court could well have approved it by simply denying review, it seems odd that at the end it decided the case was not of statewide significance.<\/p>\n

\u00a0 ii.\u00a0 The dispute between LMC and Quinn is highly unlikely to repeat.<\/h4>\n

Second, a presumptively moot case is reviewable \u201cwhen the harm to the particular plaintiff is capable of repetition yet evading review.\u201d[19]<\/a> This requires two things, one of which is that \u201cthere is a reasonable expectation that a complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.\u201d[20]<\/a> The court reasoned that, \u201c[f]or this case to recur, Quinn would have to move in with another person who has a lease in an LMC building and live there for an extended period before being discovered\u201d, and that this was unlikely.[21]<\/a><\/p>\n

The supreme court dismissed LMC\u2019s second argument on the basis that LMC is unlikely to encounter the same problem with Ms. Quinn ever again.[22]<\/a> Factually, that seems right. The chance that Ms. Quinn herself will ever again live in one of LMC\u2019s apartments is very slim.<\/p>\n

\u00a0 iii.\u00a0 LMC presents a weak collateral consequences argument and seemingly misses opportunity to make direct-consequences argument.<\/h4>\n

Third, a presumptively moot case is reviewable \u201cwhen an appellant produces evidence that collateral consequences actually resulted from a judgment.\u201d[23]<\/a><\/p>\n

LMC had argued that the amount of its claim for money damages against Ms. Quinn depended on whether she was a tenant or a trespasser: (a) if she was a tenant, her debt would be unpaid rent from April 2, 2021 through July 2022; (b) if she was a trespasser, her debt would be \u201cthe reasonable rental value of the premises for the time the wrongdoer retains such wrongful possession.\u201d[24]<\/a><\/p>\n

Without reaching the merits of LMC\u2019s argument, the court noted that it had only.\u00a0 invoked the collateral-consequences doctrine in criminal cases. It held that, \u201cLMC has failed to provide persuasive authority to explain why we should expand this exception here.\u201d[25]<\/a><\/p>\n

It seems a bit unfair to categorically reject the use of this doctrine merely because a case is civil rather than criminal. This particular case aside, there certainly are civil cases with very serious collateral consequences.<\/p>\n

That said, I don\u2019t think LMC actually established any collateral consequence. All that Ms. Quinn won was the right not to be locked out. There was no decision whether she was a \u201ctrespasser\u201d or a \u201ctenant\u201d. The courts simply concluded that she was an \u201cother regular occupant\u201d and that LMC needed a court order to remove her.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, there was no contract between LMC and Quinn. LMC argued that vociferously and Ms. Quinn never claimed she had such a contract. Both were correct. Therefore, she never owed rent since rent is payment under a lease contract. When she held over past April 7, 2021 and did not pay LMC, certainly LMC was harmed. However, regardless her title \u2013 \u201ctrespasser\u201d, \u201ctenant\u201d, \u201cother regular occupant\u201d, or something else \u2013 LMC\u2019s harm was the forgone rent it might have collected from a new tenant + any damage Ms. Quinn did to the unit + its court costs in removing her. This would not change if the supreme court reversed the district court.<\/p>\n

Interestingly, I think LMC failed to allege a direct (actual) consequence of losing the district court case. Had it won, it would have had claim for $205.50 for costs under Minn. Stat. \u00a7 549.02 for winning the case on the merits plus a claim for its filing fee of $297 under Minn. Stat. \u00a7 549.04 as the prevailing party. Either or both claims made the case not moot.<\/p>\n

Ultimately, the supreme court rejected LMC\u2019s arguments that the case was ripe dismissing LMC\u2019s appeal as moot. As a result, the Court of Appeals\u2019 precedential decision remains good law.<\/p>\n

IV.\u00a0 Analysis<\/h2>\n

A. Original statutory language and related legislative histories align with the Quinn<\/em> court\u2019s holding that the fact Ms. Smith\u2019s lease forbade other occupants without LMC\u2019s consent did not prevent Ms. Quinn from being an \u201cother regular occupant\u201d in Ms. Smith\u2019s apartment.<\/h3>\n

Both the trial and appellate courts construed Minn. Stat. \u00a7 504B.375 and Minn. Stat. \u00a7 504B.001, subd. 12 primarily based on dictionary definitions of \u201cregular\u201d and by analogy to Asseltyne v. Fay Hotel, 222 Minn. 91 (1946) (using totality of acts analysis to decide whether a woman was a boarder or a hotel guest when she paid a monthly rate to live in a hotel room as her sole residence). No effort was made to review the original language of either statute or their legislative histories; such effort is made here.<\/p>\n

The history of the applicable session laws is consistent with the Quinn<\/em> court\u2019s conclusion. The fact that Ms. Smith\u2019s lease forbade other occupants without LMC\u2019s consent did not prevent Ms. Quinn from being an \u201cother regular occupant\u201d in Ms. Smith\u2019s apartment.<\/p>\n

\u00a0 i.\u00a0 When the legislature enacted Minn. Stat. \u00a7 504B.375 in 1975 it selected the definition of \u201ctenant\u201d in the Tenant Remedies Act (\u201cTRA\u201d) to govern which occupants the new law protected.<\/h4>\n

Minn. Stat. \u00a7 504B.375 was originally enacted as Minn. Stat. \u00a7 566.175 (1975 Supp.) as part of 1975 Minn. Laws ch. 410. It has been amended since but not in any way material to this case.[26]<\/a><\/p>\n

The original bill that became 1975 Minn. Laws ch. 410 had four substantive provisions.[27]<\/a> Section 1 dealt with personal property a tenant leaves behind after vacating whereas the other three sections addressed lockouts: section 2 made a lockout a crime, section 3 provided treble damages for illegally turning off utilities, and section 5 became Minn. Stat. \u00a7 566.175 (1975 Supp.), now Minn. Stat. \u00a7 504B.375. All simply referred to \u201ctenants\u201d without defining the term effectively deeming the laws applicable to both commercial and dwelling tenants. In committee, an amendment was introduced that defined \u201ctenant\u201d in sections 1, 2, 3 and 5 as a \u201ctenant\u201d within the meaning of Minn. Stat. \u00a7 566.18, subd. 2 (1973 Supp.):<\/p>\n

Subd. 2. “Tenant” means any person who is occupying a dwelling in a building as defined in subd. 7, under any agreement, lease, or contract, whether oral or written, and for whatever period of time, which requires the payment of moneys as rent for the use of the dwelling unit, and all other regular occupants of such dwelling unit.<\/p>\n

As a result, commercial tenants were excluded from the protection of the new laws but both traditional dwelling tenants and \u201cother regular [dwelling] occupants\u201d were included. The committee amendments made it through the process and were enacted.<\/p>\n

Had the 1975 legislature wanted to protect only traditional dwelling tenants, it could have used language like that in the security-deposit statute, Minn. Stat. \u00a7 504.20 (1973), 1973 Minn. Laws ch. 561, s. 1 (\u201cAny deposit of money, the function of which is to secure the performance of a residential rental agreement \u2026 shall be governed by \u2026 this section.\u201d Instead, its new anti-lockout laws protected \u201cother regular occupants\u201d as well as traditional dwelling tenants.<\/p>\n

When all the landlord-tenant statutes in chapters 504 and 566 were recodified in 1999, wherever a prior law used \u201ctenant\u201d within the meaning of Minn. Stat. \u00a7 566.18, subd. 2 (1998), the new statute used the phrase \u201cresidential tenant\u2019 and a definition of \u201cresidential tenant\u201d was put into the definitional statute, Minn. Stat. \u00a7 504B.001 (at subd. 12).[28]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u00a0 ii.\u00a0 The definition of \u201ctenant\u201d in the TRA was designed to help traditional tenants as well as licensee-type roommates with repair problems.<\/h4>\n

Minn. Stat. \u00a7 566.18 was the definitional section of a group of statutes: Minn. Stat. \u00a7 566.18-566.33, collectively called the Tenant Remedies Act (\u201cTRA\u201d). Enacted as 1973 Minn. Laws ch. 611, s. 13-28, the TRA provided dwelling occupants with a procedure to enforce their right to repair when the \u201cowner\u201d did not obey a city inspector\u2019s order to fix the unit to the city\u2019s tenancy-repair code.<\/p>\n

Why did the TRA use an expansive definition of \u201ctenant\u201d? Committee minutes shed no light on the issue and tape recordings of floor and committee debates have long since been destroyed. However, some history of the 1971 legislative session is instructive.<\/p>\n

A package of three tenants\u2019 rights bills was introduced in 1971: 1971 HF 1161, 1971 HF 1162, and 1971 HF 1163.[29]<\/a> HF1161 became what is known as the Covenants of Habitability, now codified at Minn. Stat. \u00a7 504B.161. HF1162 became the statute protecting tenants against anti-retaliatory terminations of periodic leases, now codified at Minn. Stat. \u00a7 504B.285, subd. 2. HF1163 was the TRA in nearly the same form as the law passed in 1973.[30]<\/a> The first two files made it through the process and were signed into law that May.[31]<\/a> HF1163 died due to horse-trading at the end of the legislative session.[32]<\/a><\/p>\n

What is noteworthy about this package of bills is that both HF1161 and HF1163 protected dwelling occupants<\/em> repair rights more so than traditional dwelling tenants<\/em>. For example, HF1161 originally started as follows:<\/p>\n

[504.18] Subdivision 1. In every lease or license of residential premises, whether in writing or parol, the lessor or licensor covenants:<\/p>\n