UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

DOCKET NUMBER
18-4663

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

ANTHONY HELTON,

Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
THE HONORABLE GINA M. GROH, CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

APPELLEE'S BRIEF

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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This is an appeal of an order entered by the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia in Martinsburg. Specifically, Helton appeals the district court's Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The district court (Groh, J.) had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. The judgment was entered on September 12, 2018, and Helton timely filed a notice of appeal on September 13, 2018. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether the district court properly held that Anthony Helton's prior conviction for voyeurism under the Code of Laws of South Carolina § 16-17-470(B)(1) is a sex offense triggering the registration requirements under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA") because the voyeurism conviction is a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. Procedural History

On March 6, 2018, a federal grand jury sitting in Clarksburg, West Virginia, returned a true bill charging Anthony Dale Helton with a single count of failure to register in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a). J.A. 6. On March 14, 2018, Helton had his initial appearance before Magistrate Judge Robert W. Trumble, and the United States filed a Motion for Detention. J.A. 2. On March 19, 2018, Magistrate Judge Trumble held a detention hearing and ordered Helton detained pending his trial. J.A. 2-3.

On April 19, 2018, Helton filed a Motion to Dismiss the Indictment on the basis that he was not a sex offender required to register under SORNA. J.A. 3. On April 26, 2018, the United States filed its response in opposition. J.A. 3. On May 1, 2018, Helton filed a supplement to his Motion to Dismiss. J.A. 3. On May 3, 2018, Chief Judge Groh entered an Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. J.A. 4. On May 9, 2018, Helton entered into a conditional plea agreement with the United States. J.A. 4.

On September 10, 2018, the district court conducted a sentencing hearing and found Helton's advisory guidelines range to be twenty-four to thirty months of

imprisonment and five years of supervised release.[1] J.A. 91-92. The district court imposed a sentence of twenty-four months of imprisonment with a supervised release term of twenty years. J.A. 100-101. On September 13, 2018, Helton timely filed his Notice of Appeal. J.A. 123.

II. Statement of Facts

A. Helton is Convicted of Voyeurism in South Carolina.

On or about March 21, 2012, Helton looked through multiple windows of an apartment belonging to the victim, Jerome Brown. J.A. 134. Based on this incident, on March 22, 2012, an arrest warrant was issued for Helton in Greenville, South Carolina. J.A. 127. Specifically, the affiant stated that he obtained "a written statement from the victim and witness which states that the Defendant did look through multiple windows of the victim, Jerome Brown's apartment without authorization to do so. The victim and Defendant do not know each other." J.A. 127. The warrant listed the offense as "Sex/Peeping Tom, eavesdropping or peeping." J.A. 127. The offense code was listed as "0120." (J.A. 127). The code/ordinance section was "16-17-0470." J.A. 127. On September 24, 2013, Helton was indicted for eavesdropping or peeping tom in the Greenville General

[1] Although the guidelines range for supervised release is five years, the statute provides that the Court shall impose a term of supervised release of not less than five years to life. J.A. 99.

Sessions Court, Greenville, South Carolina, in Docket Number 2012-GS-2303012. J.A. 125-26.

On March 13, 2014, Helton pled guilty in Case Number 2012GS2303012. J.A. 130. Helton pled guilty to "Voyeurism" in violation of "§ 16-17-0470(B)(1) of the S.C. Code of Laws, bearing CDR Code # 2865." J.A. 130. The offense description is listed as "Sex/Voyeurism, violating place of privacy, views, photographs, records, or files, 1st offense." J.A. 133. On March 13, 2014, Helton was convicted in the Circuit Court of Greenville County, South Carolina. J.A. 130.

B. Helton Pleads Guilty to Failure to Register Charges.

Following his voyeurism conviction, Helton was convicted of failing to register as a sex offender. J.A. 162. On November 7, 2016, Helton was charged in Frederick County General District Court in Winchester, Virginia with "Other Sex Offender Fail to Register." *Id.* On February 7, 2017, Helton pled guilty to the charge. *Id.* On April 25, 2017, Helton was charged in Frederick County Circuit Court in Winchester, Virginia, with "Fail to Re-Register as a Sex Offender Being Second or Subsequent Offense." *Id.* On August 31, 2017, Helton pled guilty to the charge. *Id.*

C. Helton Fails to Register Change of Residency.

On November 3, 2017, Helton last registered with the West Virginia State Police and signed West Virginia State Police Form 270, Notification of Sex Offender Responsibility and Registration Certification. J.A. 154. According to

West Virginia State Police Form 270, the offender must register any change of residency to another state within ten business days prior to moving and must comply with the laws of that state. *Id.*

On November 27, 2017, the West Virginia State Police attempted to verify Helton's last registered address in High View, West Virginia. *Id.* The investigating trooper learned that Helton had left the residence on November 3, 2017. *Id.* A check of registration records indicated Helton had not changed his West Virginia Sex Offender Registration and was not currently registered anywhere else in the United States. *Id.*

On December 11, 2017, Helton was arrested by the Rockingham County, Virginia Sheriff's Department. *Id.* Helton was not registered in Virginia at the time of his arrest. *Id.* Helton was read his Miranda rights and interviewed by a Deputy United States Marshal. *Id.* During the interview, Helton stated he knew he had arrest warrants in his name, so he fled to Harrisonburg, Virginia. *Id.* After he left West Virginia, he stated he was living in a tent in the Broadway/Timberville area of Virginia. *Id.* Helton also stated he knew he was required to register as a sex offender, and he commented that "I have been told many times and I know that I have to register every time I move, change my phone number, email or even fart." *Id.* Helton then stated "I'm tired of having people watch me all the time and have to tell them everything I do . . . [t]heir policies are unrealistic and I choose not to follow them." *Id.*

D. Chief Judge Groh Denies Helton's Motion to Dismiss.

On March 6, 2018, a federal grand jury indicted Helton with a single count of failure to register based on the aforementioned conduct from November 3, 2017 to December 11, 2017. J.A. 6. On March 14, 2018, Helton had his initial appearance, and on March 19, 2018, Helton had his arraignment. J.A. 2-3. On April 19, 2018, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Indictment. J.A. 3. On April 26, 2018, the United States filed a response in opposition. *Id.* On May 3, 2018, Chief Judge Groh entered an Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. J.A. 4.

The district court found that for the indictment to survive a motion to dismiss, it must state the following three elements: (1) the defendant was "required to register under SORNA"; (2) the defendant "travel[ed] in interstate commerce"; and (3) the defendant "knowingly fail[ed] to register or update a registration as required by SORNA." J.A. 28. The district court focused its inquiry on one element: whether defendant was a person required to register under SORNA as a result of Helton's South Carolina voyeurism conviction. J.A. 28-29.

The district court held that Helton was a person required to register under SORNA. The district court found that Helton was a "sex offender" because he was convicted of a sex offense; specifically, Helton was convicted of a "criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another." J.A. 29-30. The district court applied the categorical approach to determine whether Defendant's South Carolina voyeurism conviction is a sex offense. J.A. 30-32. The

district court found that under the categorical approach, voyeurism—as defined in the Code of Criminal Laws of South Carolina § 16-17-470(B)(1)—"is a sex offense because it is a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act." J.A. 32-33. Therefore, the district court held that Defendant is required to register under SORNA. J.A. 33-34.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The district court properly held that Helton is a person required to register under SORNA. SORNA defines a sex offender as a person who was convicted of a sex offense. SORNA's primary definition of a sex offense includes five subsections. However, in this case, only the first subsection is applicable. Therefore, the issue is whether Helton was convicted of a sex offense defined as a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another. Helton's underlying prior conviction is a South Carolina voyeurism conviction, and it is this conviction that qualifies him as a sex offender.

In evaluating whether the South Carolina voyeurism conviction is a sex offense under SORNA, this Court has three approaches it could apply: the categorical approach, the modified-categorical approach, or the circumstance specific approach. SORNA's applicable subsection defines a sex offense as "a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another." 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(i). The use of the term element to define a sex offense strongly suggests that this provision refers to a generic crime, which must be using the categorical approach. Furthermore, the subsection's use of the term "elements" is indicative of a categorical approach. Moreover, Helton was convicted under a nondivisible statute, which confirms that the categorical approach should be utilized in analyzing his conviction. Although the statute underlying Helton's prior conviction lists a set of alternatives, the alternatives are not elements but merely

means to commit the crime. Therefore, the categorical approach should be applied to determine whether Helton's prior conviction qualifies as a sex offense.

In applying the categorical approach, Helton's underlying voyeurism conviction is a sex offense under SORNA. Under the pertinent South Carolina statute, a person commits the crime of voyeurism if he or she, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of any person, does any of the following actions: knowingly views, photographs, audio records, video records, produces, or creates a digital electronic file, or films another person, without that person's knowledge and consent, while the person is in a place where he or she would have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Here, the actions are simply means in which to commit the offense rather than separate elements. Therefore, the statute is not divisible and the categorical approach must be utilized.

In reviewing the elements of the prior offense, the key element of voyeurism makes it a sex offense and, in turn, a sexual act. Under South Carolina law, voyeurism is defined as an offense of a sexual nature, and a person who pleads guilty to "peeping, voyeurism, or aggravated voyeurism" under Section 16-17-470 is required to register as a sex offender. Importantly, in order to be convicted of voyeurism, the crime must be committed for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of any person. This element falls squarely under SORNA's requirement that a "sex offense" is defined, in relevant part as, "a criminal offense that has an element involving a ***sexual act*** . . . ." because the act must have been

for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of any person. The South Carolina voyeurism statute clearly requires that the act be done for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of any person. If an act is done for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire, then it follows that the act is a sexual act. Therefore, Helton is a sex offender required to register under SORNA because he was convicted of a sex offense as defined in 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(i).

ARGUMENT

Helton argues that he is not a sex offender pursuant to SORNA; therefore, he is not subject to SORNA's registration requirements. SORNA defines what constitutes a sex offense and establishes a system of "tiers" that corresponds to the severity of a sex offender's sex offense. 42 U.S.C. § 16901, *et seq.* A sex offender who knowingly fails to register or update his sex offender registration as required by SORNA is subject to criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2250. The district court correctly held that Helton is required to register as a sex offender. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit will review de novo the district court's denial of Helton's motion to dismiss the indictment because "the denial depends solely on questions of law." *United States v. Hatcher*, 560 F.3d 222, 224 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing *United States v. United Med. & Surgical Supply Corp.*, 989 F.2d 1390, 1398 (4th Cir. 1993); *United States v. Brandon*, 298 F.3d 307, 310 (4th Cir. 2002)).

I. The District Court Correctly Applied the Categorical Approach to Determine that Helton's Voyeurism Conviction Qualified as a Sex Offense under SORNA.

SORNA defines a sex offense in 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A). One definition is a "criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another." 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(i). In determining whether a defendant's prior conviction qualifies as a sex offense under this subsection, courts must select one of three approaches: the "categorical," the "modified-categorical," or the "circumstance-specific" approach. *See, e.g. United States v. Hill*, 820 F.3d 1003,

1005 (8th Cir. 2016), *cert. denied*, 137 S. Ct. 829 (2017); *United States v. Price*, 777 F.3d 700, 708 (4th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 135 S. Ct. 2911 (2015). SORNA's statutory language determines which approach the court should apply. The applicable approach, in turn, determines the information a court may consider in analyzing the prior conviction. Although the United States Supreme Court has not considered whether the approaches noted above—the categorical, the modified-categorical, and the circumstance-specific approaches—apply to prior sex offense convictions, this Court and others have regularly looked to these approaches when analyzing a defendant's prior conviction for SORNA purposes. *See Price*, 777 F.3d at 708.

A. The Categorical Approach

Courts considering prior convictions generally employ the categorical approach. *Descamps v. United States*, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013); *see also Taylor v. United States*, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990) (establishing that courts analyzing prior convictions for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), should use a "formal categorical approach"). The "central feature" of the categorical approach is "a focus on the elements, rather than the facts, of a crime." *Descamps*, 570 U.S. at 263; *see Mathis v. United States*, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248-49 (2016) (reaffirming this view). Thus, courts "'look only to the statutory definitions'—*i.e.*, the elements—of a defendant's prior offenses, and *not* 'to the

particular facts underlying those convictions.'" *Descamps*, 570 U.S. at 261 (quoting *Taylor*, 495 U.S. at 600). Under the categorical approach, a court may consult only the statutory language of the defendant's prior conviction.

B. The Modified-Categorical Approach

In *Taylor*, the Supreme Court recognized that a "narrow range of cases" may require a sentencing court analyzing a prior conviction "to go beyond the mere fact of conviction." 495 U.S. at 602. This created the "modified categorical" approach. *Descamps*, 570 U.S. at 257. The modified categorical approach applies to a defendant's prior conviction under a "divisible" statute. *See id.*; *Mathis*, 136 S. Ct. at 2249. A statute is divisible when it "comprises multiple, alternative versions of the crime." *Descamps*, 570 U.S. at 262. Where a defendant's statute of conviction is phrased in the alternative, the sentencing court must determine whether those alternatives are elements (in which case the statute is divisible and the modified categorical approach applies) or means (in which case the statute is not divisible and the categorical approach must be used). *See Mathis*, 136 S. Ct. at 2256. When the modified categorical approach applies, the court may look to certain other documents beyond the text of the statute of conviction. *Descamps*, 570 U.S. at 262. These are *Shepard* documents, which includes the indictment, the jury instructions, and the plea agreement and colloquy. *Shepard v. United States*, 544 U.S. 13 (2005); *Mathis*, 136 S. Ct. at 2249. These documents are to be used "as a tool for implementing the categorical approach . . . to determine which of a

statute's alternative elements formed the basis of the defendant's prior conviction." *Descamps*, 570 U.S. at 262.

C. The Circumstance-Specific Approach

The United States Supreme Court has created a third analytical category for considering prior convictions: the "circumstance-specific" approach. *Nijhawan v. Holder*, 557 U.S. 29, 34 (2009). In applying this approach, the court may consider the circumstances—that is the conduct—underlying a defendant's conviction. *See also Johnson v. United States*, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2579-80 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (referring to this approach as the "conduct specific" approach).

For the following reasons, the district court correctly determined that the categorical approach applies to determine that Defendant's prior conviction qualifies as a sex offense.

II. The Categorical Approach Applies in Analyzing Helton's Voyeurism Conviction under SORNA.

SORNA defines a sex offender as an individual "convicted of a sex offense." 34 U.S.C. § 20911(1). A sex offense means

> (i) a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another;
> (ii) a criminal offense that has a specified offense against a minor;
> (iii) a Federal offense (including an offense prosecuted under section 1152 or 1153 or Title 18) under section 1591, or chapter 109A, 110 (other than section 2257, 2257A, or 2258), or 117, of Title 18;
> (iv) a military offense specified by the Secretary of Defense under section 115(a)(8)(C)(i) of Public Law 105-119 (10 U.S.C. 951 note); or

(v) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in clauses (i) through (iv).

42 U.S.C. 20911(5)(A)(i-v). Under SORNA, a sex offender must register and keep his or her registration current in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, is an employee, or is a student. 34 U.S.C. § 20913. Because 18 U.S.C. § 2250 applies only to someone whose prior sex offense conviction requires him to "register under [SORNA]," courts assess whether a defendant's prior conviction qualifies as a "sex offense" as defined by SORNA. Courts therefore compare an individual's prior conviction to SORNA's definitions of sex offense found in 34 U.S.C. § 20911.

Although SORNA's primary definition of a sex offense includes five subsections, in this case only the first subsection is applicable. 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A). Section 20911(5)(A)(i) defines a sex offense as a "criminal offense that has an ***element*** involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another." (emphasis added). Congress's use of the term "element" strongly suggests that this provision refers to a generic crime, which must be analyzed categorically. *See Nijhawan*, 557 U.S. 29 at 36; *United States v. Faulls*, 821 F.3d 502 (4th Cir. 2016). Moreover, this Court has noted that this subsection refers to "elements," which is more indicative of a categorical approach. *See Price*, 777 F.3d at 708; *United States v. Vanderhorst*, 668 F. App'x 185, 187 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting that "§ 16911(5)(A)(i) refers to 'elements,' [but] neither § 16911(5)(A)(ii) nor § 16911(7)(I) refers to 'conduct' and the 'nature of that conduct'" to distinguish

why the circumstance-specific approach was the appropriate approach under § 16911(7)(I) but implying that the categorical approach was appropriate under §16911(5)(A)(i)). Accordingly, the use of this "contrasting terminology" indicates that Congress intended the subsections to be analyzed under different approaches. *Id.*; *Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement*, 543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005) ("We do not lightly assume that Congress has omitted from its adopted text requirements that it nonetheless intends to apply, and our reluctance is even greater when Congress has shown elsewhere in the same statute that it knows how to make such a requirement manifest."). Therefore, either the categorical or modified categorical approach should apply when evaluating prior convictions under 34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(i).

The modified categorical approach applies only if "the defendant was previously convicted under a divisible statute, meaning that the offense contains a set of alternative elements." *Price*, 777 F.3d at 705 (citing *Descamps*, 570 U.S. at 261). When the statute underlying a prior conviction is phrased in the alternative, the court must determine whether the alternatives are elements or means. *See Mathis*, 136 S. Ct. at 2256. If the alternatives are elements, the statute is divisible and the modified categorical approach should be applied. *Id.* However, if the alternatives are means, the statute is not divisible and the categorical approach must be used. When a statutory list is "drafted to offer illustrative examples, then

it includes only a crime's means of commission," and the categorical approach is applied. *Id.*

On March 13, 2014, Helton pled guilty to voyeurism in violation of the Code of Laws of South Carolina § 16-17-470(B)(1). The statute provides that

> A person commits the crime of voyeurism if, ***for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of any person***, he or she knowingly views, photographs, audio records, video records, produces, or creates a digital electronic file, or films another person, without that person's knowledge and consent, while the person is in a place where he or she would have a reasonable expectation of privacy.

S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-470(B) (emphasis added). Where a defendant's statute of conviction is phrased in the alternative, the sentencing court must determine whether those alternatives are elements (in which case the statute is divisible and the modified categorical approach applies) or means (in which case the statute is not divisible and the categorical approach must be used). *See Mathis*, 136 S. Ct. at 2256. In this case, a person commits the crime of voyeurism if he or she, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of any person, does any of the following actions: "knowingly views, photographs, audio records, video records, produces, or creates a digital electronic file, or films another person, without that person's knowledge and consent, while the person is in a place where he or she would have a reasonable expectation of privacy." S. C. Code Ann. § 16-17-470(B). Here, the actions—views, photographs, etc.—are simply means in which to commit the offense rather than elements. The statute merely provides illustrative

examples of the means of commission of the crime. *Id.* Therefore, the statute is not divisible and the categorical approach must be utilized.

III. Helton's Voyeurism Conviction is a Prior Sex Offense Conviction under SORNA.

In applying the categorical approach to this case, the central feature is "a focus on the elements, rather than the facts." *Descamps*, 133 U.S. at 2285; *see Mathis*, 136 S. Ct. at 2248-49. Thus, in looking at only the elements of the prior offense, the key element of "voyeurism" makes it a sex offense and, in turn, a sexual act. Under South Carolina law, voyeurism is defined as an offense of a sexual nature. *See State v. Wade*, 2012 WL 10862434, Appellate Case No. 2011-193672 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012) (upholding a defendant's requirement to register as a sex offender in light of his "peeping, voyeurism, or aggravated voyeurism" conviction); *see Care and Treatment of Brown v. State*, 372 S.C. 611, 643 S.E.2d 118, 123 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007) (upholding a trial court's finding that a defendant's "eavesdropping/peeping tom amount to a sexually violent offense"). Moreover, under South Carolina law, a defendant who pleads guilty to "peeping, voyeurism, or aggravated voyeurism" under Section 16-17-470 is required to register as a sex offender. S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-430(A) ("Any person, regardless of age, residing in the State of South Carolina who in this State . . . pled guilty . . . to an offense described below . . . shall be required to register pursuant to the provisions of this article."); S.C. Code Ann. § 23-3-430(C) ("For purposes of this article, a person

who . . . pled guilty . . . for any of the following offenses shall be referred to as an offender: . . . (12) peeping, voyeurism, or aggravated voyeurism ([s]ection 16-17-470). . . .”). Importantly, in order to be convicted of voyeurism, the crime must be committed “for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of any person. . . .” S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-470(B). This element falls squarely under SORNA’s requirement that a “sex offense” is defined, in relevant part as, “a criminal offense that has an element involving a ***sexual act*** . . . .” because the act must have been for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of any person. 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A)(i).

Moreover, SORNA does not define the terms “sexual act” and “sexual contact,” and the definitions should not be limited to a definition under a separate statute. Helton relies on definitions from 18 U.S.C. § 2246 to determine “sexual act” and “sexual contact.” J.A. 8-9, 13. Congress did not specifically incorporate these definitions into SORNA; therefore, they are not controlling and a broader definition of the terms “sexual act” and “sexual contact” should apply. *See United States v. Sinerius*, 504 F.3d 737, 743 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting defendant’s argument that “sexual abuse” should be defined by reference to 18 U.S.C. § 2242 because Congress’s decision *not* to refer to that provision reflects a congressional intent to define the term “as a generic offense”), *cert. denied*, 552 U.S. 1211 (2008). Rather, this Court should rely on “regular usage to see what Congress probably meant.” *Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions*, 137 S.Ct. 1562, 1569 (2017)

(quoting *Lopez v. Gonzales*, 549 U.S. 47, 53 (2006)). The South Carolina voyeurism statute clearly requires as an element of the crime that the act be done for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of any person. If an act is done for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire, then it follow that the act is a sexual act. Therefore, Helton is a sex offender required to register under SORNA because he was convicted of a sex offense as defined in 42 U.S.C. §16911(5)(A)(i).

CONCLUSION

The district court properly held that Helton's underlying conviction of voyeurism in South Carolina was a sex offense under SORNA and that Helton therefore was subject to SORNA's registration requirements. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the district court's holding.

Respectfully submitted,

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-4663 Caption: United States of America v. Anthony Helton

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Date: December 21, 2018

/s/Lara K. Omps-Botteicher
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