

STATE OF MINNESOTA

DISTRICT COURT

COUNTY OF RAMSEY

SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

Darcy Jude Drobec,

CASE TYPE: CIVIL/OTHER/
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

COURT FILE NO. 62-CV-17-3615
Honorable Leonardo Castro

v.

Drew Evans, Superintendent of the Minnesota
Bureau of Criminal Apprehension,

**FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER
CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS**

Defendant.

This matter came before the Honorable Leonardo Castro, Judge of District Court, on August 8, 2019, on Plaintiff Darcy J. Drobec's ("Plaintiff" or "Drobec") Motion for Summary Judgment, and Defendant Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension's ("Defendant" or "BCA") Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss. Bradford W. Colbert, Esq., and Patrick Cochran, Certified Student Attorney, Legal Assistance to Prisoners, appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. Angela Helseth Kiese, Assistant Minnesota Attorney General, appeared on behalf of the BCA. At the conclusion of the hearing the Court requested supplemental briefing. Upon receiving final submissions, the Court took the matter under advisement on September 13, 2019. The parties having been heard, based upon all pleadings, memoranda, attachments, records and proceedings herein, this Court makes the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

In November 1993, a jury found Drobec guilty of one count of second-degree intentional murder, one count of second-degree felony murder, and one count of kidnapping. With regard to the kidnapping count, the jury found that the victim was not released in a safe place and suffered

great bodily harm during the course of the kidnapping. The district court adjudicated her guilty of all three counts and entered an executed sentence to the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) for a term of 459 months for second-degree intentional murder (an upward durational departure), and 91 months for kidnapping.

At the time of the offense and conviction, none of the crimes with which Drobec was charged or convicted were registerable offenses under the Minnesota predatory offender registration law. *See* Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1 (1993). Nor did any of Drobec’s charges “aris[e] out of the same set of circumstances” as a registerable offense. *Id.* at subd. 1(1)(ii). Therefore, the requirement to register was never addressed prior to trial, during trial, at sentencing, or any other proceeding. However, in 1999, the Minnesota legislature amended the predatory registration laws, striking the language “involving a minor victim” from the statute. As a result, all charges arising from kidnapping offenses became registerable. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1(1)(ii) (1999).

In February 2004, while incarcerated at the Minnesota Correctional Facility in Shakopee, and more than ten years after being sentenced, Drobec was informed that she was required to register as a predatory offender. The DOC had her complete the registration and notice forms, which were then submitted to the BCA; Drobec was not afforded a hearing before being required to register. Upon review, the BCA concluded that the expanded predatory offender statute applied to Drobec, and opened her file in the Registry. Drobec remains incarcerated in MCF Shakopee with an anticipated release date of May 22, 2023, and her sentence expiring on July 10, 2031. The BCA contends that Drobec is required to register as a predatory offender, and will be required to register for ten years from the date of her last release from incarceration. While incarcerated, Drobec has remained compliant with the registration requirements, and the DOC and BCA

continue requiring her to register.

Drobec moves this court for summary judgment arguing that retroactive application of the predatory registration requirement violates: (1) the presumption against retroactive application of laws; (2) the constitutional prohibition against *ex post facto* laws; and (3) her constitutional right to procedural and substantive due process. The BCA moves for dismissal arguing that Drobec's claims are untimely and barred by the statute of limitations. It further moves this Court for summary judgment.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. Legal Standards

A. Motion to Dismiss

A court should dismiss a complaint when it fails to state a claim for which the court may grant relief. Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). When reviewing a motion to dismiss, courts consider the factual allegations in the plaintiff's complaint to be true. *Elzie v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety*, 298 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Minn. 1980). But a court need not give any deference to a plaintiff's legal conclusions, opinions, or statements that are general and indefinite. *Bahr v. Capella Univ.*, 788 N.W.2d 76, 81 (Minn. 2010); *Martens v. Minn. Mining & Mfg.*, 616 N.W.2d 732, 747 (Minn. 2000). Dismissal is appropriate when it is clear that the plaintiff could introduce no facts consistent with the pleadings that would support granting the relief demanded. *N. States Power Co. v. Franklin*, 122 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Minn. 1963).

B. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. "A motion for summary judgment shall be granted when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that either party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” *Fabio v. Bellomo*, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993) (citing Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03). Summary judgment is not appropriate when reasonable minds could differ and draw different conclusions from the evidence presented. *DLH, Inc. v. Russ*, 566 N.W.2d 60, 69 (Minn. 1997) (citing *Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Tapemark Co.*, 273 N.W.2d 630, 634 (Minn. 1978)).

A party opposing summary judgment may not rely merely on its pleadings but must present specific facts demonstrating there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. *W.J.L. v. Bugge*, 573 N.W.2d 677, 680 (Minn. 1998); Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.05. The court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. *Bugge*, 573 N.W.2d at 680. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” *DLH, Inc.*, 566 N.W.2d at 69 (quoting *Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

Once the moving party has established a *prima facie* case that entitles them to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present specific facts that raise a genuine issue for trial. *Bebo v. Delander*, 632 N.W.2d 732, 737 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). A genuine issue of material fact exists when a fact may be reasonably resolved in favor of either party. *DLH, Inc.*, 566 N.W.2d at 69. However, there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial when the nonmoving party presents evidence which merely creates a metaphysical doubt as to a factual issue. *Id.* at 71. If any legitimate doubt exists as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, the doubt must be resolved in favor of finding that the fact issue exists. *Poplinski v. Gislason*, 397 N.W.2d 412, 414 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), *rev. denied* (Minn. 1987).

II. Statute of Limitations

Statutes of limitations are based largely on the proposition that if a person has a claim, it would be inequitable for the person to assert such a claim after an unreasonable lapse of time. *Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann*, 808 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn. 2011) (citation omitted). “Requiring parties to bring claims within the statute of limitations period decreases the likelihood that actions will be brought after ‘papers may be lost, facts forgotten, or witnesses dead.’” *Id.* (quoting *Bachertz v. Hayes-Lucas Lumber Co.*, 275 N.W. 694, 697 (Minn. 1937)).

In this case, the statute of limitations for each of Drobec’s claims is six years. *See* Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5); *see also Owens v. Okure*, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989) (holding that the statute of limitations for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim is the same as a state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions); *Weavewood, Inc. v. S & P Home Invs.*, 821 N.W.2d 576, 579–80 (Minn. 2012) (holding that “statutes of limitations apply to a declaratory judgment action to the same extent as a nondeclaratory proceeding based on the same cause of action) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).

The statute of limitations begins to run when a cause of action accrues. Minn. Stat. § 541.01; *Hamann*, 808 N.W.2d at 832. A cause of action accrues when some damage occurs and a plaintiff could state a claim for relief. *Antone v. Mirviss*, 720 N.W.2d 331, 335–36 (Minn. 2006). “Courts must examine the nature of the [alleged] wrongful conduct at issue in order to determine when the cause of action accrues.” *Hamann*, 808 N.W.2d at 837. The cause of action accrues regardless of whether the plaintiff is aware of the extent of any harm. *Id.* at 832 (citing *Dalton v. Dow Chem. Co.*, 158 N.W.2d 580, 585 (Minn. 1968)). “Where a greater injury remains uncertain, tolling is not appropriate if another injury is a consequence of the same alleged misconduct.” *Antone*, 720 N.W.2d at 336 (citations omitted).

The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized, however, that in some instances the tortious injury being inflicted on a plaintiff is continuous. *See Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. State*, 229 N.W.2d 3, 12 (Minn. 1975) (“[A]cts continuing in nature would toll the statute of limitations.”). The continuing violation doctrine recognizes that a continuous practice “over a period of time [can] indicate a systematic repetition of the same policy and constitute a sufficiently integrated pattern to form, in effect, a single . . . act.” *Hubbard v. United Press Int’l, Inc.*, 330 N.W.2d 428, 440 n.11 (Minn. 1983). The continuing violation doctrine is most commonly applied in discrimination cases involving wrongful acts that manifest over a period of time, rather than in a series of discrete acts. *See Sigurdson v. Isanti Cty.*, 448 N.W.2d 62, 66–67 (Minn. 1989); *Giuliani v. Stuart Corp.*, 512 N.W.2d 589, 595 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). However, the doctrine has been applied outside the employment discrimination context. *N. States Power Co. v. Franklin*, 122 N.W.2d 26, 28–29 (Minn. 1963) (trespass); *State Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc.*, 555 N.W.2d 908, 912 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (workers’ compensation coverage), *rev. granted in part, decision modified*, 558 N.W.2d 480 (Minn. 1997). When the doctrine is applied, the *final* act is used to determine when the statute-of-limitations period begins for the entire course of conduct. *See Sigurdson*, 448 N.W.2d at 67–68.

The BCA required Drobec to register in 2004, and continues to require Drobec to register each year until her registration period ends. Because she is still being compelled to register, Drobec argues that she is being subjected to a continuing violation. The registration statute requires every person with a registration requirement to register at least once a year. All people required to register under Minn. Stat. § 243.166 are required to fill out a “Verification Form” a certain number of times each year, depending on the situation that initiated the registration requirement. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 4(e). The information registrants are required to provide on the Verification Form

is identical to the information that must be provided when the person is initially required to register. *See id.* § 243.166, subd. 4(e)(2). If Drobec is required to register, she will have to provide the required registration information at least once a year, every year, for the duration of her registration requirement.

Additionally, if Drobec is required to register, she must inform the BCA or appropriate law enforcement agency anytime there is a change in the information she had previously provided. If she plans on changing her primary address, she must provide written notice to the authority with whom she is currently registered, and she must also include her new planned address at least five days before leaving her previous primary address. *Id.* § 243.166, subd. 3(b). Further, and in addition to change in residential addresses, if there is a change in her employment, enrollment in school, or ownership or consistent use of a car, she must immediately notify the authority with whom she is required to register. *Id.* § 243.166, subd. 4a(b).

Moreover, the registration statute requires more than *just* registration.¹ If a person is admitted to a hospital or other health care facility, all the residents of that facility must be notified. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 4b(c)-(d). Prior to living in the same household as a minor, the supervisory corrections agent must provide authorization and notify the appropriate child protection agency. Minn. Stat. § 244.057. Finally, the registration requirements are not static—they are changing frequently, in most cases adding requirements that make registration even more onerous.²

Therefore, this Court concludes that as a matter of law, the continuing registration requirements, the additional burdens of registration, and the changing nature of the registration

¹ This Court does not make a judgment on the efficacy or appropriateness of the registration requirements, but rather simply notes that much is involved and many requirements exist.

² *See* attached overview of the many changes made to Minn. Stat. § 243.166 over the past ten years making compliance with the registration requirement increasingly more difficult.

requirements make registration a continuing violation. The registration requirements are a set of practices that “over a period of time [can] indicate a systematic repetition of the same policy and constitute a sufficiently integrated pattern to form, in effect, a single . . . act.” *Hubbard*, 330 N.W.2d at 440 n.11.

Drobec argues and this Court agrees that *Longoria v. State*, 749 N.W.2d 104 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008), is persuasive on the issue of continuing violation. In *Longoria*, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that a person charged with failing to register could not claim that her prosecution was time-barred by the statute of limitations because her failure to notify the authorities of her change in address occurred outside the statute of limitations. According to the court of appeals, it would be an “absurd result” to hold that a person legally required to register is entirely immune from prosecution for failure to do so once the required registration period has ended. *Id.* at 106–07. The court concluded that a “violation of the predatory-offender-registration statute is an offense that continues as long as the person required to register fails to do so.” *Id.* at 107. It follows, therefore, that if someone who fails to register as required is engaged in a continuing violation for criminal prosecution purposes, that one who is unlawfully being required to register is also being subjected to a continuing violation.

Notwithstanding the continuous violation, each time Drobec is required to register or amend her registration amounts to a separate actionable wrong. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that even when an initial discriminatory decision occurred outside the period in which a suit could be brought, continued acts based on that discrimination constituted separate actionable wrongs. *Bazemore v. Friday*, 478 U.S. 385, 395–96 (1986). In *Bazemore*, the Court considered a Title VII claim brought on behalf of black employees of the North Carolina Agricultural Extension Service. *See Id.* The Court ultimately found that although “recovery may

not be permitted for pre-1972 acts of discrimination, to the extent that the discrimination was perpetuated after 1972, liability may be imposed.” *Id.* at 395. Although Drobec was initially required to register in 2004, each year that she is required to register gives birth to another six year period during which she may bring an action to declare that the BCA is acting unlawfully and unconstitutionally.

If this Court were to hold that a person cannot challenge the validity of mandated predatory offender registration after six years of first being informed of the requirement, this Court would be sanctioning the very real possibility that a person could face a lifetime of unlawful and unjustified government intrusion with no viable avenue for legal recourse. *See* Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 6(d) (describing when a person will be required to register as a predatory offender for the remainder of their life). This would be a true absurdity.

III. Retroactive Application of the Law

A law is presumptively not retroactive. *See* Minn. Stat. § 645.21 (2019). For a law to have retroactive effect, the legislature must clearly manifest its intent to make the law retroactive. *Id.*; *Gomon v. Northland Family Physicians, Ltd.*, 645 N.W.2d 413, 416 (Minn. 2002). Inclusion of the word “retroactive” is a clear manifestation that the legislature intended a statute to be applied retroactively. *Duluth Firemen’s Relief Ass’n v. City of Duluth*, 361 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 1985).

If the legislature had intended the 1999 amendment to apply retroactively, they would have clearly indicated as much. But the amendment did not include the word “retroactive” or any other similar language. Instead, the enabling language read as follows:

Sec. 6. [EFFECTIVE DATE.]

Sections 1 to 4 are effective August 1, 1999, and apply to persons released from commitment on or after that date. Section 5 is effective the day following final enactment.

Act of May 25, 1999, ch. 233 § 6, 1999 Minn. Laws 1809, 1813. “Commitment” as used elsewhere in the statute refers exclusively to those who are subject to civil commitment. Therefore, based on a plain reading of the enacting language, the legislature was referring to those who have been civilly committed. If the legislature had intended for the statute to apply to those who were incarcerated, they would have used the word “confined”; to hold otherwise contravenes the plain language of the amendment. Although the BCA originally argued that the phrase “released from commitment” applied to both civil commitments and criminal incarceration, in its supplemental memorandum it concedes that the phrase “persons released from commitment” refers only to persons who have been civilly committed.

The interpretation of the statute as being nonretroactive is supported by recent amendments to the predatory offender registration statute. In those amendments, the legislature clearly indicated that where it expands the class of individuals required to register, it does not intend that the change apply retroactively. For example, the most recent amendment to the registration requirements section was in 2016, and it included a similar amendment expanding its scope to all prostitution offenses by striking the language “involving a minor under the age of 13.” Act of June 1, 2016, ch. 189, sec. 11, 2016 Minn. Laws 81, 85–87 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(2) (2016)). This amendment included the following enabling language:

EFFECTIVE DATE. This section is effective August 1, 2016, and applies to crimes committed on or after that date.

Id. at 87. Given the presumption against retroactivity, the lack of specific retroactive language included in the amendment, and the subsequent language applying similar registration requirement amendments prospectively, requiring Drobec to register based on an amendment that was passed after her conviction violates the presumption against the retroactive application of laws. Moreover, the legislature did add language in 2000 indicating that the statute should apply retroactively. Yet

the relevant subdivision was immediately repealed the following year. *Compare* Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 10 (2000), *with* § 243.166, subd. 10 (2001). When this history is coupled with the most recent amendment in 2016, which applies only prospectively, it becomes increasingly clear that there is no evidence of legislative intent to apply these sections retroactively—let alone an intent that is “clear[] and manifest[.]” *Gomon*, 645 N.W.2d at 416.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes as a matter of law that (1) Drobec’s claims arise from a continuing violation and, therefore, are not barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) requiring Drobec to register as a predatory offender under Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1(1)(ii) (1999) for an offense that did not require registration at the time of conviction violates the presumption against retroactive application of laws. Accordingly, Drobec is entitled to declaratory relief as ordered herein, and this Court need not reach Drobec’s *ex post facto* and/or due process claims. Neither the BCA nor the DOC can require Drobec to register as a predatory offender based on a statutory amendment that was enacted six years after her date of offense and does not explicitly contain retroactive language; under these circumstances, requiring registration for an offense that was not registerable at the time of conviction clearly and unacceptably violates the presumption against the retroactive application of laws.


ORDER

1. Darcy Jude Drobec’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of retroactivity is **GRANTED**.
2. Darcy Jude Drobec’s request for declaratory judgment is **GRANTED**.
3. The Minnesota Bureau of Apprehension is enjoined from requiring Darcy Jude Drobec to register as a predatory offender for offenses committed prior to 1999.
4. Darcy Jude Drobec is not required to register as a predatory offender for offenses committed prior to 1999.

5. The Court reserves its decision on Plaintiff's demand for costs and attorneys' fees.
6. Plaintiff shall submit by December 23, 2019, a memorandum of law with supporting authority for granting costs and attorneys' fees. Defendant may respond by January 6, 2020. No reply will be submitted.
7. Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment and Dismissal are **DENIED**.

LET JUDGEMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

December 2, 2019

BY THE COURT


Leonardo Castro
Judge of District Court

AMENDMENTS TO MINN. STAT. § 243.166 FROM 2008–2019

Year	Statute	Change	Effective Date
2008	Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3a(b)	Person with primary address as correctional facility and is scheduled for release and who does not have new primary address shall register with law enforcement in area where person will be staying at least 3 days before they are released	July 1, 2008
	Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 4(e)(1)	If offender is admitted to or resides in a treatment facility or residential housing unit or shelter, the bureau must mail annual verification form to law enforcement where offender recently reported. Law enforcement must provide verification form to offender and ensures that offender signs it and returns it to the bureau. Notice is sufficient if verification form is sent by first class mail to person's last reported primary address, or for persons registered under 3a, to the law enforcement authority where offender most recently reported	Applies to offenders who are required to appear on or after August 1, 2008
	Minn. Stat. § 243.167	Person has to register as offender under 243.166 if they were convicted of a comparable offense in another state and were not required to register previously because the registration requirements did not apply to them at the time the offense was committed, or at the time they were released.	Applies to predatory offenders required to register on or after August 1, 2008
2009	Minn. Stat. § 244.05, subd. 6(c)	As a condition of release for an inmate required to register under 243.166 who is placed on intensive supervised release, commissioner shall prohibit inmate from accessing, creating, or maintain personal web page, profile, account, password, or user name for (1) social media or (2) instant messaging or chat program that allows people under the age of 18 to become members or create a personal page.	Applies to offenders required to register before, on, or after August 1, 2010 (pretty much all)
2010	Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1a(c)	Definition of dwelling under statute does not include a publicly supervised or privately operated shelter/facility designed to provide temporary living accommodations for homeless individuals.	Applies to all persons required to register as offenders on or after July 1, 2010
	Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1a(i)	Location of publicly supervised or privately operated shelter or facility designated to provide temporary	Applies to all persons required to register as offenders on or after July 1, 2010

		living accommodations for homeless individuals does not constitute secondary address.	
	Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 3(b)	If person under statute is going to move, they must give written notice of their new address to the assigned corrections agent or law enforcement authority. Immediately after they move, they must give written notice in person to the corrections agent or law enforcement authority.	April 15, 2010
2011	Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(2)	Person must register under statute if they were charged with or petitioned for a violation, or attempted to violate, aid, abet, or conspired to commit criminal abuse under 209.235	Applies to crimes committed on or after August 1, 2011
2012	N/A	N/A	N/A
2013	Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 5a	Level III offenders shall be placed on conditional release for ten years <u>after they are released from prison.</u> ***Previously it was after they complete the sentence imposed.	Applies to crimes committed on or after August 1, 2013
2014	Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(2)	Person must register under section if they were charged with or petitioned for violation of, or attempt to violate, or aid, abet, or conspire to commit crime under 609.255, <u>solicitation, inducement, or promotion of the prostitution of minor or engaging in sex trafficking of minor in violation of 609, or prostitution offense involving minor under age of 13.</u> ***Previously it was if they solicited a minor to engage in prostitution	Applies to crimes committed on or after August 1, 2014
	Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(4)	Person was <u>charged with or petitioned</u> for crimes under 243.166, Subd. 1b(1-3), or <u>convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for the offense or another offense arising out of same set of circumstances.</u> ***Previously you had to be convicted, not charged.	
	Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 4(a)	Registration provided to corrections agent or law enforcement agent must consist of statement in writing signed by person, giving info required by bureau, <u>fingerprints</u> , and photos... ***Previously a fingerprint card would suffice.	

	Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 4(d)(1)	Agent or authority <u>may photograph any offender at any time and frequency chosen by agent or authority.</u> ***Previously offender was to appear before the agent or authority once every six months.	
2015	N/A	N/A	N/A
2016	Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 4c	<u>All notices required by section must be in writing and signed by person required to register.</u> ***This is an addition.	May 22, 2016
	Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 7	<u>Law enforcement may disclose status of individual as a predatory offender to a child protection worker with a local welfare agency for purposes of doing a family assessment under 626.556.</u> ***This is an addition.	May 22, 2016
	Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(2)	Person shall register under section if they were charged with or petitioned for violation of, or attempt to violate, a prostitution offense in violation of 609.324. ***Previously it only included a minor under age of 13.	August 1, 2016 – all crimes committed on or after
2017	N/A	N/A	N/A
2018	N/A	N/A	N/A
2019	Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1a(c)	Corrections agent" means a county or state probation agent or other corrections employee. The term also includes United States Probation and Pretrial Services System employees who work with a person subject to this section. ***This is an addition.	
	Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(2)	A person shall register under section if charged/petition for felony violation, or attempted to violate, aide, abet, conspire to commit a <u>surreptitious intrusion under 609.746.</u> ***This is an addition.	August 1, 2019 – crimes committed on or after
	Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 4(a)	The registration provided to the corrections agent or law enforcement authority, must consist of a statement in writing signed by the person, giving information required by the bureau, fingerprints,	August 1, 2019 – committed on or after

	<p><u>biological specimen for DNA analysis as defined under section 299C.155, subdivision 1...</u></p> <p>***This is an addition.</p>	
Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 4(f)	<p>For persons registered under this section on the effective date of this section, each person, on or before one year from that date, must provide a biological specimen for the purpose of DNA analysis to the probation agency or law enforcement authority where that person is registered. A person who provides or has provided a biological specimen for the purpose of DNA analysis under chapter 299C or section 609.117 meets the requirements of this paragraph.</p> <p>***This is an entire addition and completely replaced the old portion. The old portion did not require any of this.</p>	August 1, 2019 – committed on or after
Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 4(g)	<p>For persons registered under this section on the effective date of this section, each person, on or before one year from that date, must provide fingerprints to the probation agency or law enforcement authority where that person is registered.</p> <p>***This entire portion is an addition</p>	August 1, 2019 – committed on or after
Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 4a(7)	<p>Person required to register must provide corrections agent or law enforcement expiration year of the motor vehicle license plate tabs of all vehicles owned by the person; and all phone numbers, including work, school, and home, and any phone service.</p> <p>***This entire portion is an addition and was not required previously</p>	August 1, 2019 – committed on or after