{"id":1204,"date":"2019-02-17T08:17:01","date_gmt":"2019-02-17T14:17:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/sex-offense-litigation-policy\/?p=1204"},"modified":"2019-02-17T08:17:18","modified_gmt":"2019-02-17T14:17:18","slug":"doe-v-dewine-6th-cir-2018","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/sex-offense-litigation-policy\/2019\/02\/17\/doe-v-dewine-6th-cir-2018\/","title":{"rendered":"Doe v. DeWine (6th Cir. 2018)"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

Doe v. DeWine, 910 F.3d 842 (6th Cir. 2018)<\/h2>\n

Nature of Case: <\/strong><\/strong> Doe was convicted of a sexual offense in 2006. At the time, sentencing court was empowered to determine whether or not a defendant was a “Sexual Predator” for registration purposes. Doe was designated by Ohio courts as a sexual predator, which subjected her to lifetime registration requirements. Doe brought a federal suit alleging violations of procedural and substantive Due Process rights on the grounds that she was entitled to a hearing to demonstrate that she is no longer likely to engage in sexual offenses. District Court struck down Ohio statutes to the extent that they precluded Doe from seeking a hearing to remove or terminate her designation as a sexual predator and state appealed.
\n
\nHolding:\u00a0<\/strong> 6th Circuit held that Ohio’s statutory scheme did not violate Doe’s Procedural Due Process rights. Her current dangerousness was not material to the state’s characterization of her as someone who is likely to engage in repeat sexual offenses, and therefore she was not entitled to a hearing to rebut the same.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Case Documents<\/em><\/h2>\n