{"id":1429,"date":"2019-06-12T09:45:35","date_gmt":"2019-06-12T14:45:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/sex-offense-litigation-policy\/?p=1429"},"modified":"2019-10-21T15:10:18","modified_gmt":"2019-10-21T20:10:18","slug":"state-v-kirby-ind-ct-app-2019","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/sex-offense-litigation-policy\/2019\/06\/12\/state-v-kirby-ind-ct-app-2019\/","title":{"rendered":"State v. Kirby (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)"},"content":{"rendered":"
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State v. Kirby, 120 N.E.3d 574 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)<\/h2>\n

Nature of Case: <\/strong><\/strong>Kirby, Appellee, was convicted of a sexual offense and thus became subject to Indiana\u2019s SORNA. Kirby had subsequently applied for and received permission to attend his son\u2019s school events. Subsequent changes to Indiana law barred Kirby from attending these events, and he brought a declaratory judgment action. The trial court declared the statute was punitive as applied to Kirby, and thus violative of the Ex Post Facto clause, and state appealed.<\/p>\n

Holding:\u00a0<\/strong> Court of Appeals of Indiana reversed, finding that the statute was not unconstitutional as-applied to Kirby. The Court evaluated the Mendoza-Martinez factors and found that the statute was non-punitive and therefore was not unconstitutional as-applied to Kirby.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Case Documents<\/em><\/h2>\n