{"id":1610,"date":"2019-08-13T17:07:58","date_gmt":"2019-08-13T22:07:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/sex-offense-litigation-policy\/?p=1610"},"modified":"2019-10-21T15:02:24","modified_gmt":"2019-10-21T20:02:24","slug":"holland-v-georgia-11th-cir-2019","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/sex-offense-litigation-policy\/2019\/08\/13\/holland-v-georgia-11th-cir-2019\/","title":{"rendered":"Holland v. Georgia (11th Cir. 2019)"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Holland v. Georgia, No. 18-13445 (11th Cir. 2019)<\/h2>\n

Nature of Case: <\/strong><\/strong> Appellant was required to register as a sex offender in Georgia, and brought a federal civil rights lawsuit claiming that Georgia’s sex offense registry laws violated a number of constitutional provisions. Specifically, Appellant brought claims under Substantive Due Process, Equal Protection, Ex Post Facto, and the Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, and Appellant sought review.<\/p>\n

Holding:\u00a0<\/strong> The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. The unpublished opinion holds that Georgia’s sex offense registry–while retroactive–is not punitive and therefore violates neither the Ex Post Facto clause nor the Eighth Amendment’s bar on cruel and unusual punishment (relying largely on Smith v. Doe<\/i><\/a>). The Court further concluded that Appellant’s challenges to Due Process and Equal Protection were precluded by precedent.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Case Documents<\/em><\/h2>\n