{"id":1721,"date":"2019-09-16T13:15:37","date_gmt":"2019-09-16T18:15:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/sex-offense-litigation-policy\/?p=1721"},"modified":"2019-10-21T15:46:55","modified_gmt":"2019-10-21T20:46:55","slug":"state-v-lafountain-or-ct-app-2019","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/sex-offense-litigation-policy\/2019\/09\/16\/state-v-lafountain-or-ct-app-2019\/","title":{"rendered":"State v. Lafountain (Or. Ct. App. 2019)"},"content":{"rendered":"
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State v. Lafountain, 299 Or. App. 311 (Or. Ct. App. 2019)<\/h2>\n

Nature of Case: <\/strong><\/strong> Defendant was required to register as a sex offender under Oregon law, and had–at various times–listed his residence as a detention facility and a parking lot, as he was homeless. Defendant was eventually indicted for failing to register a change of address, and proceeded to trial. Defendant was convicted, and appealed, arguing that the trial court misconstrued the definition of “residence” under state law; specifically, Defendant argued that a “residence” is a place that a person considers home and to which the person expects to return on a regular basis.<\/p>\n

Holding: <\/strong> Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the Defendant’s conviction, finding that the state’s evidence was legally insufficient. Examining the purpose of the statute and the ordinary definition of the term “residence,” the Court concluded that it is a term that refers to something more than “just a transient visit or sojourn.” Further, the term does not include a time period when that person is incarcerated in a detention facility.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Case Documents<\/em><\/h2>\n