{"id":189,"date":"2017-07-26T09:29:54","date_gmt":"2017-07-26T14:29:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/sex-offense-litigation-policy\/?page_id=189"},"modified":"2018-08-13T17:57:15","modified_gmt":"2018-08-13T22:57:15","slug":"mcgee-v-bartow-2010","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/sex-offense-litigation-policy\/2017\/07\/26\/mcgee-v-bartow-2010\/","title":{"rendered":"McGee v. Bartow (7th Cir. 2010)"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2010)<\/h2>\n

Nature of Case: <\/strong><\/strong> Habeas corpus petition filed in Wisconsin federal court alleging that civil commitment of petitioner was unconstitutional under the due process clause in that diagnoses of personality disorder NOS with antisocial features and paraphilia NOS were insufficient to support commitment. Petitioner further alleged that his commitment was unconstitutional in that committing court did not make a specific finding as to his inability to control his behavior.<\/p>\n


\nHolding:\u00a0<\/strong> Commitment of petitioner was constitutional. Under Wisconsin statute, finding that petitioner met criteria for SVP commitment necessarily included finding in re volitional control, and commitment on finding of mental disorder not within four corners of DSM does not violate due process.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Case Documents<\/em><\/h2>\n