{"id":2131,"date":"2020-05-16T14:52:50","date_gmt":"2020-05-16T19:52:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/sex-offense-litigation-policy\/?p=2131"},"modified":"2020-05-18T10:42:02","modified_gmt":"2020-05-18T15:42:02","slug":"doe-v-gwyn-e-d-tenn-2020","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/sex-offense-litigation-policy\/2020\/05\/16\/doe-v-gwyn-e-d-tenn-2020\/","title":{"rendered":"Doe v. Rausch (E.D. Tenn. 2020)"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Doe v. Rausch, No. 17-cv-00504 (E.D. Tenn. 2020)<\/h2>\n

Nature of Case: <\/strong><\/strong> Doe brought a civil rights lawsuit alleging that Tennessee’s sex offense registry scheme violated his rights in a number of ways: that it impermissibly imposed retroactive punishment on him, that it deprived him of his 1st Amendment rights by way of Tennessee’s internet usage reporting requirements, and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. Both Doe and state authorities moved for summary judgment.<\/p>\n

Holding: <\/strong> Federal trial court for the Eastern District of Tennessee granted Summary Judgment for Doe on his Ex Post Facto claims, finding that Tennessee’s sex offense registration scheme had become sufficiently punitive as to negate any erstwhile civil intent. The Court granted Summary Judgment for the state on Doe’s First and Fourteenth Amendment claims.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Case Documents<\/em><\/h2>\n