{"id":2284,"date":"2020-10-14T08:01:08","date_gmt":"2020-10-14T13:01:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/sex-offense-litigation-policy\/?p=2284"},"modified":"2020-10-28T08:07:39","modified_gmt":"2020-10-28T13:07:39","slug":"lingaw-v-lumpkin-idaho-2020","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/sex-offense-litigation-policy\/2020\/10\/14\/lingaw-v-lumpkin-idaho-2020\/","title":{"rendered":"Lingaw v. Lumpkin (Idaho 2020)"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Lingaw v. Lumpkin, No. 47098 (Idaho 2020)<\/h2>\n

Nature of Case: <\/strong><\/strong> Appellant was required to register as a sex offender and was subject to Idaho’s statutes relating to residential restrictions. Appellant purchased real property and, thereafter, brought a declaratory judgment action to resolve questions about whether he could reside in the property given its proximity to a gymnasium that was used by the school district for after-school activities. Appellant conceded at trial that the gymnasium was within 500 feet of his property, but argued that the building was not a “school” as defined by state law. The lower court disagreed and found that the building was a school, and Appellant sought review.<\/p>\n

Holding: <\/strong> The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s opinion, holding amongst other things that the gymnasium used by the school district qualified as a “school” for the purposes of the state’s residency restriction statute.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Case Documents<\/em><\/h2>\n