{"id":2388,"date":"2021-01-19T15:55:12","date_gmt":"2021-01-19T21:55:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/sex-offense-litigation-policy\/?p=2388"},"modified":"2021-03-01T15:19:00","modified_gmt":"2021-03-01T21:19:00","slug":"maves-v-alaska-dept-of-public-safety-alaska-2020","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/sex-offense-litigation-policy\/2021\/01\/19\/maves-v-alaska-dept-of-public-safety-alaska-2020\/","title":{"rendered":"Maves v. Alaska Dep\u2019t of Public Safety (Alaska 2021)"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Maves v. Alaska Dep\u2019t of Public Safety, No. S-17492 (Alaska 2021)<\/h2>\n

Nature of Case: <\/strong><\/strong> Appellant was convicted of two sexual assault offenses in Colorado, one of which was subject to a deferred judgment. Appellant subsequently moved to Alaska and was notified by the state Department of Public Safety that he would be required to register for life due to multiple convictions. After a somewhat complicated procedural history, eventually the state intermediate court held that Appellant was required to register for life. Appellant sought review from the state supreme court.<\/p>\n

Holding: <\/strong> Supreme Court of Alaska reversed, holding that Appellant was not subject to the lifetime registration requirements because — for the purposes of interpreting the 1994 statute — offenses that were subject to deferred adjudication did not count insofar as registration was concerned. Individuals who had convictions set aside were likely not the sort of person that the 1994 ASORA statute was intended to reach, as they had an individualized assessment of lower risk, and thus set aside convictions did not count towards the lifetime registration trigger.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Case Documents<\/em><\/h2>\n