{"id":2427,"date":"2021-02-10T09:51:44","date_gmt":"2021-02-10T15:51:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/sex-offense-litigation-policy\/?p=2427"},"modified":"2021-03-03T09:54:28","modified_gmt":"2021-03-03T15:54:28","slug":"doe-v-lee-m-d-tenn-2021","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/sex-offense-litigation-policy\/2021\/02\/10\/doe-v-lee-m-d-tenn-2021\/","title":{"rendered":"Doe v. Lee (M.D. Tenn. 2021)"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Doe v. Lee, No. 16-cv-2862 (M.D. Tenn. 2021)<\/h2>\n

Nature of Case: <\/strong><\/strong> Plaintiffs were individuals who resided in Tennessee and had previously been convicted of sex offenses and were thus required to register under state law. They brought a \u00a7 1983 challenge to Tennessee’s sex offense registration law, alleging a variety of constitutional claims including violations of Ex Post Facto provisions of the United States Constitution. In the trial court, both parties moved for summary judgment.<\/p>\n

Holding: <\/strong> Federal trial court for the Middle District of Tennessee granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment insofar as they brought an ‘as-applied’ Ex Post Facto challenge, but denied the same challenge on facial grounds. The Court also granted summary judgment to the Defendants with respect to the First Amendment claims that the Plaintiffs brought, but did not reach the other constitutional claims.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Case Documents<\/em><\/h2>\n