{"id":2999,"date":"2022-08-16T17:16:08","date_gmt":"2022-08-16T22:16:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/sex-offense-litigation-policy\/?p=2999"},"modified":"2022-08-16T17:16:08","modified_gmt":"2022-08-16T22:16:08","slug":"united-states-v-thayer-7th-cir-2022","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/sex-offense-litigation-policy\/2022\/08\/16\/united-states-v-thayer-7th-cir-2022\/","title":{"rendered":"United States v. Thayer (7th Cir. 2022)"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

United States v. Thayer, No. 21-2385 (7th Cir. 2022)<\/h2>\n

Nature of Case: <\/strong><\/strong> After molesting his daughter in 2003, defendant pled guilty to fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota law. Defendant was sentenced to 33 months\u2019 imprisonment and ten years\u2019 probation and was required to register on Minnesota\u2019s sex offense registry.<\/p>\n

Defendant subsequently moved to Wisconsin. Defendant did not register on Wisconsin\u2019s registry. Defendant was charged with failure to register under Federal SORNA in July 2020. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment arguing that his Minnesota conviction did not qualify as a \u201csex offense\u201d triggering an obligation to register under Federal SORNA based on a mismatch between Federal SORNA and the Minnesota statute underlying his conviction.<\/p>\n

Three analytical frameworks guide courts in assessing whether a prior offense in another jurisdiction constitutes a \u201csex offense\u201d within the meaning of Federal SORNA.\u00a0 The first and the second\u2014the formal categorical approach and the modified categorical approach\u2014require courts to ignore the defendant\u2019s actual conduct and \u201clook solely to whether the elements of the crime of conviction match the elements of the federal [ ] statute.\u201d Gamboa v. Daniels<\/em>, 26 F.4th 410, 415 (7th Cir. 2022) (internal quotations omitted).\u00a0 Whereas, the third method, the circumstance-specific approach, focuses on the facts\u2014not the elements\u2014of a prior conviction.<\/p>\n

Defendant\u2019s argument in this case, is that applying the categorical approach, the mismatch between the Minnesota statute and SORNA\u2019s definition call for the dismissal of the indictment against him for failure to register under SORNA. The government argued, by contrast, that the circumstance-specific approach should apply.<\/p>\n

The district court applied the categorical approach and dismissed the indictment against Defendant.<\/p>\n

Holding: <\/strong>The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded the district court\u2019s order holding (1) as a matter of first impression that courts should employ circumstance-specific approach when determining whether conduct was a sex offense against a minor, as would render conviction a \u201csex offense\u201d under SORNA; (2) Chevron deference did not apply to Department of Justice’s implementing regulations; (3) circumstance-specific approach applied when determining whether defendant’s sexual conduct fell under \u201cRomeo and Juliet\u201d exception to SORNA.<\/p>\n

Jackson-Akiwumi, Circuit Judge, filed dissenting opinion.<\/p>\n

Case Documents<\/em><\/h2>\n