{"id":3020,"date":"2022-09-20T20:00:32","date_gmt":"2022-09-21T01:00:32","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/sex-offense-litigation-policy\/?p=3020"},"modified":"2022-09-20T20:02:35","modified_gmt":"2022-09-21T01:02:35","slug":"cao-v-pennsylvania-state-police-pa-commw-ct-2022","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/sex-offense-litigation-policy\/2022\/09\/20\/cao-v-pennsylvania-state-police-pa-commw-ct-2022\/","title":{"rendered":"Cao v. Pennsylvania State Police (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2022)"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Cao v. Pennsylvania State Police, No. 512 M.D. 2015 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2022)<\/h2>\n

Nature of Case: <\/strong><\/strong> In 2000, Petitioner pled guilty to sexual offenses committed in 1995. \u00a0Following his plea, Petitioner was sentenced to two and a half to five years\u2019 incarceration followed by ten years\u2019 probation. \u00a0At the time of his convictions, Petitioner was required to register with the Pennsylvania State Police for life as a \u201csex offender\u201d pursuant to Megan\u2019s Law II, Act of May 10, 2000, and he began registering upon his release from prison in 2003.<\/p>\n

In 2004, the General Assembly enacted Megan\u2019s Law III, Act of November 24, 2004. \u00a0In 2011, the General Assembly replaced Mean\u2019s Law III with SORNA I, which took effect on December 20, 2012.<\/p>\n

In 2017, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz<\/em>, 640 Pa. 699 (2017), held that SORNA I violated the ex post facto<\/em> provisions of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions when applied retroactively to those convicted of certain crimes before SORNA I’s effective date and who were subject to increased registration obligations under SORNA I.<\/p>\n

Based on that ruling, Petitioner was informed that the Pennsylvania State Police had removed Petitioner\u2019s name from the registry. \u00a0In 2018, however, in response to Muniz<\/em>, the General Assembly enacted SORNA II, which amended certain provisions of SORNA I and added new provisions, effective immediately. \u00a0Following SORNA II\u2019s enactment, Petitioner was once again informed that he was required to register for life.<\/p>\n

Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of his lifetime registration requirement, filing an Amended Petition for Review in 2018. \u00a0In 2021, following the Supreme Court holding in Commonwealth v. Lacombe<\/em>, 234 A.3d 602 (2020), which held that retroactive application of Subchapter I of SORNA II is nonpunitive and does not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto<\/em> laws, the Pennsylvania State Police filed an Application for Summary Relief, asking the Court to enter judgment. Petitioner filed a brief in opposition to the Application for Summary Relief, asserting that application of SORNA II to him is an unconstitutional ex post facto<\/em> violation pursuant to the Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Commonwealth v. Santana<\/em>, 266 A.3d 528 (2021), because he committed his offenses before the enactment of any sex offender registration laws.<\/p>\n

Holding: <\/strong> The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court decision grants the Pennsylvania State Police\u2019s Application for Summary Relief and dismisses Petitioner\u2019s Amended Petition for Review. \u00a0In so ruling, the Court stated that Petitioner \u201cmisconstrued\u201d Santana<\/em>, which involved the retroactive application of SORNA I<\/span>, which was declared an unconstitutional ex post facto violation in Muniz.<\/em> \u00a0Here, with SORNA II<\/span> as the relevant statutory framework, the Court concludes that Petitioner\u2019s ex post facto<\/em> claim is foreclosed by Commonwealth v. Lacombe<\/em>, 234 A.3d 602 (2020) and T.S. v. Pennsylvania State Police<\/em>, 241 A.3d 1091 (2020), which held that Subchapter I of SORNA II is nonpunitive and not an ex post facto<\/em> law, even when applied to individuals whose offenses pre-dated the enactment of any sex offender registration law.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Case Documents<\/em><\/h2>\n