{"id":3149,"date":"2023-06-29T16:50:26","date_gmt":"2023-06-29T21:50:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/sex-offense-litigation-policy\/?p=3149"},"modified":"2023-06-29T16:50:26","modified_gmt":"2023-06-29T21:50:26","slug":"people-ex-rel-rivera-v-superintendent-woodbourne-correctional-facility-n-y-2023","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/sex-offense-litigation-policy\/2023\/06\/29\/people-ex-rel-rivera-v-superintendent-woodbourne-correctional-facility-n-y-2023\/","title":{"rendered":"People ex rel. Rivera v. Superintendent, Woodbourne Correctional Facility (N.Y. 2023)"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

People ex rel. Rivera v. Superintendent, Woodbourne Correctional Facility, No. 47 (N.Y. 2023)<\/h2>\n

Nature of Case: <\/strong><\/strong>Petitioner, who was subject to Sexual Assault Reform Act’s (SARA) school grounds condition, prohibiting level three registrants under Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) from coming within 1,000 feet of school and childcare facilities, filed application for writ of habeas corpus, asserting that retroactive application of school grounds condition violated Ex Post Facto Clause of United States Constitution as applied to him.<\/p>\n

As practical matter, the SARA \u201cschool grounds condition\u201d prevents the release of incarcerated individuals who have been unable to find housing that complies with SARA\u2019s conditions. Individuals who are set to begin supervised release and are unable to find SARA-compliant housing are either transferred to residential treatment facilities or remain in prison.<\/p>\n

Petitioner who has remained in prison past his supervised release date due to his inability to find SARA-compliant housing argues that these laws are punitive and therefore, as applied to him, a violation of the Ex Post Facto clause.<\/p>\n

The New York supreme court agreed, granted Petitioner\u2019s application, ordered New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) to release petitioner to parole supervision, and enjoined DOCCS from applying school grounds condition to petitioner. DOCCS appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division,\u00a0200 A.D.3d 1370, 160 N.Y.S.3d 411, reversed. Petitioner was granted leave to appeal.<\/p>\n

Holding: <\/strong> \u00a0The New York Court of Appeals held that retroactive application of SARA’s \u201cschool grounds condition\u201d did not facially violate Ex Post Facto Clause. \u00a0In so holding, the Court placed great weight on the statutory provision\u2019s rational connection to a non-punitive purpose, asserting \u201cthe temporary confinement of sex offenders in correctional facilities, while on a waiting list for SARA-compliant … housing, is rationally related to a conceivable, legitimate government purpose of keeping level three sex offenders more than 1,000 feet away from schools\u201d (internal citations omitted). \u00a0The Court further noted that it is unable to conclude from this record that prolonged incarceration is a common result of SARA, rather than an idiosyncratic effect.<\/p>\n

Rivera, J. Dissent:<\/strong> Concludes that \u201cthe residency prohibition violates the Ex Post Facto Clause simply because failure to comply with it\u2014both before and after release\u2014results in the \u2018paradigmatic\u2019 punishment: incarceration.\u201d<\/p>\n

Halligan, J. Dissent:<\/strong> Argues that the majority does not \u201csufficiently grapple with whether mounting evidence that SARA-type restrictions have no beneficial impact on public safety (or worse yet, may be deleterious) renders SARA’s retroactive application excessive and thus violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Case Documents<\/em><\/h2>\n