{"id":819,"date":"2018-06-29T09:55:34","date_gmt":"2018-06-29T14:55:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/sex-offense-litigation-policy\/?p=819"},"modified":"2018-06-29T09:55:34","modified_gmt":"2018-06-29T14:55:34","slug":"fourth-amendment-constraints-on-the-technological-monitoring-of-convicted-sex-offenders","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mitchellhamline.edu\/sex-offense-litigation-policy\/2018\/06\/29\/fourth-amendment-constraints-on-the-technological-monitoring-of-convicted-sex-offenders\/","title":{"rendered":"Fourth Amendment Constraints on the Technological Monitoring of Convicted Sex Offenders"},"content":{"rendered":"
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McJunkin & Prescott, Fourth Amendment Constraints on the Technological Monitoring of Convicted Sex Offenders<\/em>, 21 New Crim. L. Rev., (2018, forthcoming)<\/h2>\n

Abstract:\u00a0<\/b>More than forty U.S. states currently track at least some of their convicted sex offenders using GPS devices. Many offenders will be monitored for life. The burdens and expense of living indefinitely under constant technological monitoring have been well documented, but most commentators have assumed that these burdens were of no constitutional moment because states have characterized such surveillance as \u201ccivil\u201d in character \u2014 and courts have seemed to agree. In 2015, however, the Supreme Court decided in Grady v. North Carolina that attaching a GPS monitoring device to a person was a Fourth Amendment search, notwithstanding the ostensibly civil character of the surveillance. Grady left open the question whether the search \u2014 and the state\u2019s technological monitoring program more generally \u2014 was constitutionally reasonable. This Essay considers the doctrine and theory of Fourth Amendment reasonableness as it applies to both current and envisioned sex offender monitoring technologies to evaluate whether the Fourth Amendment may serve as an effective check on post-release monitoring regimes.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n