Cao v. Pennsylvania State Police (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2022)

Cao v. Pennsylvania State Police, No. 512 M.D. 2015 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2022)

Nature of Case: In 2000, Petitioner pled guilty to sexual offenses committed in 1995.  Following his plea, Petitioner was sentenced to two and a half to five years’ incarceration followed by ten years’ probation.  At the time of his convictions, Petitioner was required to register with the Pennsylvania State Police for life as a “sex offender” pursuant to Megan’s Law II, Act of May 10, 2000, and he began registering upon his release from prison in 2003.

In 2004, the General Assembly enacted Megan’s Law III, Act of November 24, 2004.  In 2011, the General Assembly replaced Mean’s Law III with SORNA I, which took effect on December 20, 2012.

In 2017, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 640 Pa. 699 (2017), held that SORNA I violated the ex post facto provisions of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions when applied retroactively to those convicted of certain crimes before SORNA I’s effective date and who were subject to increased registration obligations under SORNA I.

Based on that ruling, Petitioner was informed that the Pennsylvania State Police had removed Petitioner’s name from the registry.  In 2018, however, in response to Muniz, the General Assembly enacted SORNA II, which amended certain provisions of SORNA I and added new provisions, effective immediately.  Following SORNA II’s enactment, Petitioner was once again informed that he was required to register for life.

Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of his lifetime registration requirement, filing an Amended Petition for Review in 2018.  In 2021, following the Supreme Court holding in Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602 (2020), which held that retroactive application of Subchapter I of SORNA II is nonpunitive and does not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws, the Pennsylvania State Police filed an Application for Summary Relief, asking the Court to enter judgment. Petitioner filed a brief in opposition to the Application for Summary Relief, asserting that application of SORNA II to him is an unconstitutional ex post facto violation pursuant to the Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Commonwealth v. Santana, 266 A.3d 528 (2021), because he committed his offenses before the enactment of any sex offender registration laws.

Holding: The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court decision grants the Pennsylvania State Police’s Application for Summary Relief and dismisses Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Review.  In so ruling, the Court stated that Petitioner “misconstrued” Santana, which involved the retroactive application of SORNA I, which was declared an unconstitutional ex post facto violation in Muniz.  Here, with SORNA II as the relevant statutory framework, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s ex post facto claim is foreclosed by Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602 (2020) and T.S. v. Pennsylvania State Police, 241 A.3d 1091 (2020), which held that Subchapter I of SORNA II is nonpunitive and not an ex post facto law, even when applied to individuals whose offenses pre-dated the enactment of any sex offender registration law.