California District Court order granting a preliminary injunction, enjoining the federal government from prosecuting California residents under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 for a violation of SORNA without first obtaining certification from the State of California that the individual was required to register under California state law, and, in a prosecution for a failure to provide specific required information, that California law allows the individual to furnish that information to state authorities.
California Court of Appeals opinion affirming lower court and holding that under California law Juvenile Court lacked authority to impose sex offense registration requirements upon juvenile who was not committed to Division of Juvenile Justice.
Louisiana Court of Appeals opinion concluding that Louisiana statute, La. R.S. 14:91.5, which prohibits the use of social networking sites by select categories of required registrants, is narrowly tailored and does not violate First Amendment rights.
Opinion by the Massachusetts Supreme Court concluding that the imposition of global positioning system (GPS) monitoring as a condition of the defendant’s probation following a conviction of rape constituted an unreasonable search in violation of art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
Minnesota Supreme Court opinion holding that, under Minnesota law, separate convictions for failure to register involving the same assignment of a corrections agent violated prohibitions against double jeopardy.
Eleventh Circuit opinion holding that the continuing violation doctrine applies to required registrants’ claims based on reputational injury and regular reporting requirements in challenge to constitutionality of sex offense registration law.
Eleventh Circuit per curiam opinion rejecting plaintiff-appellant’s Ex Post Facto challenge and concluding that the provisions of Alabama’s sex offense registration law at issue, including residency and employment restrictions, homeless-reporting requirements, travel notification requirements, and direct community notification requirements, were not punitive in effect.
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court opinion concluding that based on recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent SORNA II is nonpunitive in effect and retroactive application of the statute did not violate Petitioner’s rights under state and federal ex post facto clauses.
New York Appellate Division holding as a matter of first impression that, because of the life-long implications of SORA risk level, when a defendant has invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination the SORA court should not assess any points for a failure to accept responsibility when defendant’s trial testimony denied the allegations and he has a pending direct appeal.
Ninth Circuit opinion, on remand from the United States Supreme Court, concluding that Appellant was not “in custody” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as result of his Alaska state conviction, despite SORNA registration requirements in Tennessee based on his Alaska conviction.
Seventh Circuit opinion holding, as a matter of first impression, that courts should employ circumstance-specific approach when determining whether conduct was a sex offense against a minor, as would render a conviction a sex offense under SORNA.
Seventh Circuit opinion affirming district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction and concluding that plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their Fourth Amendment claim because, under the totality of the circumstances, lifetime GPS monitoring of purported class of individuals convicted of repeat sex offenses against children is not an unreasonable search.
Michigan Court of Appeals opinion reversing lower court decision and concluding that because SORA is a punitive collateral consequence for the conviction of certain crimes, a defendant must be informed of its imposition before entering a guilty plea and the registration requirement must be included in the judgment of sentence.
Michigan Court of Appeals opinion in Eighth Amendment case concluding that Michigan’s SORA statute, as amended in 2021, is punitive in effect and that its punishment was cruel and unusual as applied to defendant where the offense underlying the registration requirement lacked a sexual component.
Wisconsin Supreme Court rejects transgender woman’s challenge to Wisconsin registry based on registry provision preventing registrants from legally changing their names, concluding that (1) under well established precedent, placement on the registry is not a “punishment” under the Eighth Amendment and, even if it was, registration is neither cruel not unusual, and (2) petitioner’s right to free speech does not encompass the power to compel the State to facilitate a change of her legal name.
North Carolina Court of Appeals opinion concluding that lifetime Satellite Based Monitoring (“SBM”) of Defendant was not an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment after balancing the state’s interest in “preventing and prosecuting future crimes”, Defendant’s “diminished expectation of privacy both during and after any period of post-release supervision,” and the “limited intrusion” caused by lifetime SBM.
Massachusetts Court of Appeals opinion in failure to register case concluding that trial court judge abused his discretion in excluding expert testimony proposed by the defendant regarding mental disorders which impacted his ability to remember his registration obligation.
Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinion applying a categorical approach analysis and concluding that sexual assault under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and sexual assault under the Pennsylvania Criminal Code are not comparable offenses supporting the classification of Appellee as a tier III registrant under Pennsylvania’s Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act.
Missouri Court of Appeals decision determining, contrary to prior Missouri appellate court decisions, that a “tier I” sex offender under both MO-SORA and SORNA, who is otherwise eligible for removal from the Registry after satisfying the requirements of relevant MO-SORA provisions, should not be required to remain on the Registry for the remainder of their life due to the purported “interplay” between the requirements of MO-SORA and SORNA.
In a split decision, the Washington Supreme Court, sitting en banc, concludes that a pro se Petitioner’s guilty to plea to a Failure to Register charge was constitutionally valid even though the trial court did not explicitly inform Petitioner that the knowledge element of failure to register necessarily includes knowledge of the specific circumstance giving rise to the responsibility to register under the statute.
District Court granting Plaintiff a preliminary injunction where Plaintiff’s right to live with his wife and step-children was prohibited by parole conditions preventing him from contacting any person under the age of eighteen, concluding that Plaintiff’s right to live with his wife was fundamental, that he was likely to succeed on the merits of his § 1983 due process claim, that he faced a likelihood of irreparable harm, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored issuance of a preliminary injunction.
Missouri Supreme Court opinion holding that allegations in abandoned charges could not be considered in determining sex offense registration status and that a sheriff lacked authority to determine whether Appellant was required to register, but concluding that a writ of prohibition was not appropriate to control the sheriff because his determination was not a judicial or quasi-judicial act.
The Second Circuit opinion reversing dismissal of a First Amendment claim challenging requirement that those registered under Connecticut’s sex offense registration law notify the state each time they create a new email address, instant messenger address, or other internet communication identifier, concluding that because Connecticut’s requirement risks chilling online speech, it is subject to heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment.
Ninth Circuit opinion concluding that a waiver of the right to appeal a sentence does not apply to certain constitutional claims and concluding that a special condition of supervised release restricting the possession of a computer, including any electronic device capable of accessing the internet or processing or storing data as described at 18 U.S.C. Section 1030(e)(1), is unconstitutionally vague.
District Court holding rejecting Full Faith and Credit Clause and Equal Protection arguments and holding, first, that Florida may require a new resident to register as a “sex offender” based on a crime committed in a state where the individual lived previously, even though a court in that state terminated that state’s registration requirement and, second, that Florida is not required to purge or deny public access to prior registration records where an individual has left the state.
Rhode Island Supreme Court opinion in postconviction registry challenge affirming Superior Court’s judgment in part and quashed the judgment in part, concluding that Defendant is no longer required to register, that dates of alleged offenses, not dates of conviction, controlled whether a registration duty was violated, and that the state’s argument that earlier convictions gave rise to new independent duty to register was outside the scope of remand.
Supreme Court of Georgia opinion holding that two-year statute of limitations did not bar Appellant’s registry challenge seeking prospective declaratory relief due to the recurring annual nature of the registration requirement imposed on Appellant.
Tenth Circuit opinion vacating a lower court order imposing conditions of supervision including a revised Sexual Material Prohibition and a Mental Health Condition, concluding that the lower court (1) failed to make particularized findings of compelling circumstances and balance competing First Amendment concerns with respect to the revised Sexual Material Prohibition, and (2) failed to give even a generalized statement of reasons to justify the Mental Health Condition.
Supreme Court of Arkansas opinion concluding that SORA’s plain language requires Defendant-Appellee to register in spite of his acquittal for all relevant charges, because first-degree false imprisonment and kidnapping are defined as “sex offenses” under SORA, and SORA’s express language requires a person to register if he or she has been acquitted of a “sex offense” on the grounds of mental disease or defect.
Fourth Circuit opinion rejecting Plaintiff-Appellant’s Equal Protection and Eighth Amendment claims where a plea to a lesser offense resulted in worse treatment under the registry, holding that differential treatment between the charges of “carnal knowledge” and “indecent liberties” passed rationale basis scrutiny and that Virginia’s registry scheme does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment” because it is not punitive.